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RESPONSE
TIERED ORIGINALITY AND THE DUALISM OF COPYRIGHT
INCENTIVES
Shyamkrishna Balganesh *

I

N a well argued and thought-provoking new article, Gideon
Parchomovsky and Alex Stein attempt to give copyright’s requirement
of originality real meaning, by connecting it to the system’s avowed
institutional goals. 1 To this end, they focus on disaggregating originality
into three tiers and providing creative works within each tier with a
different set of rights and liabilities. Parchomovsky and Stein are indeed
correct to lament the meaninglessness of originality under current
copyright doctrine. Yet their proposal does not quite fully explore the
incentive effects of differentiated originality, especially as between
upstream and downstream creators. Nor does it tell us why some of
copyright’s more recent innovations are not the right place to give effect
to their ideas and principles. In this Response, I examine how their
refashioned originality doctrine might fit within copyright’s incentive
structure, and in the process ask whether there might be better ways of
integrating it into the institution’s existing common law structure.
I.ORIGINALITY AND THE INCENTIVE TO BE CREATIVE

Copyright’s principal normative justification today is utilitarian.
Deriving from the Constitution’s emphasis on “Progress” and the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Many thanks to
Gideon Parchomovsky for comments and helpful discussions.
1
Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1505 (2009).
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promotion of “Science and useful Arts,” 2 courts, scholars, and
policymakers today contend that copyright exists primarily as an
incentive for authors to produce and disseminate their creations to the
public. 3 Through the promise of limited exclusionary control over their
expressive creations, the system induces the very production of such
expression. Or so the theory tells us.
Parchomovsky and Stein seem to accept copyright’s utilitarian
substructure, and their originality proposal attempts to situate itself
within this framework. 4 A differentiated originality regime, they
contend, will encourage creators to generate more creative (that is, more
original) works, thereby producing greater net social welfare. 5 In so
arguing, they take as a given a direct relationship between originality
and aggregate social benefit.
Parchomovsky and Stein focus their attention on one of several costs
normally associated with the copyright system: the cost to future
creators who seek to make use of prior creations⎯also referred to as
copyright’s dynamic inefficiency. 6 And it is here that the
Parchomovsky-Stein model makes a very important contribution to
copyright theory. In its traditional formulation, copyright’s theory of
incentives focuses entirely on providing creators with an incentive to
create, measured in terms of the scope and extent of its grant of
exclusivity. Propertarian tendencies that today dominate the field tend to
view it as analogous to a standard property interest (excepting of course
the deadweight losses that come as a consequence of the nonrival nature
of its subject matter) that operates against the world at large, that is, in
rem. This tends to neglect the reality that copyright, unlike standard
property interests, and in contrast to its closest cousin, patent law, is a
bipolar entitlement⎯where the plaintiff’s entitlement is defined entirely
by reference to a defendant’s actions. In other words, the existence and
scope of the entitlement are always determined in a bilateral setting,
during a trial for infringement. It is a defendant’s (potential freerider’s)
actions that necessitate legal validation and enforcement of the
2

See U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
For an overview of copyright’s incentives in theory and as applied, see Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1569, 1577–81
(2009).
4
See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 1, at 1508, 1517.
5
Id. at 1517 (“[O]nly original works promote social welfare . . . .”).
6
See id. at 1515. For an overview of this phenomenon, see Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of
Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom 36–37 (2006).
3

2009]

Tiered Originality

69

entitlement through the system of copyright. In this sense then,
copyright law tends to resemble traditional common law entitlements
(such as those in tort and unjust enrichment), rather than property rights
that derive from tangible resources. 7
Note that the traditional theory of copyright incentives focuses
entirely on the incentive effects on one side of the bilateral equation in
which the interest fructifies. In other words, copyright’s incentive
framework is thought to relate exclusively to a plaintiff-creator via the
exclusionary rights that it grants him or her. This ignores the reality that
copyright’s incentive effects can and do affect actual and potential
defendants, that is, copyists. Given the reality that most creativity today
is sequential and builds on work from the past, copyright law’s
commitment to inducing creativity necessitates examining its effects on
creative borrowing as well. 8 Today’s plaintiff-creators are thus very
likely tomorrow’s defendant-copyists and vice-versa, a reality that the
traditional theory of incentives is hard-placed to accommodate. 9
Copyright therefore creates two separate inducements, one upstream and
the other downstream. The former consists of its promise of limited
market exclusivity, or “rights-incentive,” while the latter consists
primarily of its reduction or elimination of liability for infringement for
certain kinds of copying, best described as its “immunity-incentive.”
Thus if copyright is to concern itself with creativity of both
kinds⎯upstream creativity and downstream (sequential) creativity⎯it
needs to strike the right balance between both kinds of incentives, for a
reduction in one operates as an expansion of the other.
The Parchomovsky-Stein model of differentiated originality is then
best understood as an attempt to balance copyright’s upstream incentive
with its downstream incentive. Their focus on the importance of the
latter category is well borne out by recent studies that seem to indicate
that downstream creators are risk-averse and tend to be deterred from
creative borrowing, even when such borrowing may be legitimate as a
matter of law. 10

7
I have elaborated on this argument in previous work. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh,
Debunking Blackstonian Copyright, 118 Yale L.J. 1126, 1162 (2009).
8
See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1109 (1990)
(noting how all creativity is, in part, derivative).
9
See Benkler, supra note 6, at 37–38.
10
See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law,
116 Yale L.J. 882, 887–906 (2007).
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Their model proposes three tiers of originality under which a
defendant’s liability for copying is assessed. 11 The first tier, the
“doctrine of inequivalents,” is restricted to situations where a copier
borrows from a protected work, but in the process injects a high level of
originality and creativity into the final product. 12 In this situation, the
model immunizes the copier from suits for copyright infringement
altogether. 13 To be entitled to this immunity though, it appears that the
copyist’s work needs to be significantly more than just minimally
original. Yet Parchomovsky and Stein nowhere tell us how this
threshold is to be assessed, beyond describing it as “exceptional.” 14
Furthermore, even assuming that courts will be able to work this
standard pure, as they have others, it is not clear why the authors apply it
exclusively to the downstream incentive side of the copyright equation,
and not the upstream side. A core intuition underlying their proposal is
that copyright law treats works of differential creativity similarly, which
is both inefficient and unfair. 15 If their proposal is directed at remedying
this unfairness, shouldn’t it apply to both upstream and downstream
creativity? More specifically, why shouldn’t an independent (as opposed
to borrowing) creator whose creativity is deemed exceptional by the
same standards that they propose be entitled to something more than a
creator whose work does not meet such standards? Or put another way,
shouldn’t a less creative work get less exclusionary protection than an
exceptionally creative one?
Consider the following example involving two artists, A and B. A’s
work is path-breaking, does not involve any borrowing at all from
previous works, and is exceptionally creative; while B’s work does not
meet the same creativity standard. A decade after A and B create their
works, there come along two new artists, Y and Z. Here, while Y’s work
borrows from A’s and B’s works very heavily, it is nonetheless very
creative and introduces new techniques. Z’s work borrows from A and B
similarly, but does so with significantly less creativity than Y’s work.
(Let us also assume that Z’s work is less original than is B’s). Now
consider the working of the doctrine of inequivalents as between these
four artists. Against Z, A and B have similar (if not identical) rights: A’s
11

Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 1, at 1507–08.
Id. at 1525–26.
13
Id. at 1525.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 1506.
12
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additional creativity has no place here. Against Y, neither A nor B has
any claim, as a consequence of the doctrine of inequivalents. In sum, A
and B come to be treated exactly the same, even though one is
exceptionally creative and the other is not, even as against a defendant
who is entitled to no immunity under the doctrine. What incentive, then,
would A have to be any more creative than B? If the idea behind the
proposal was to generate an incentive to be creative, on the assumption
that creativity corresponds linearly to social welfare, the proposal here
appears incomplete. 16
The added-value doctrine, the model’s second tier of originality,
compares the creativity of the parties when the defendant’s work does
not qualify for the doctrine of inequivalents.17 In situations where the
original work is more creative, the plaintiff is entitled to seek injunctive
relief. If not, she must be satisfied with damages. 18 In our hypothetical,
both A and B can seek injunctive relief against Z. The fact that A’s
creativity exceeded B’s⎯or that the difference between A’s originality
and Z’s was vastly in excess of the difference between B’s originality
and Z’s⎯is of little consequence. Again, the model’s focus on the
downstream incentive comports well with its premise on the connection
between creativity and social welfare, but its failure to differentiate
between levels of creativity on the rights-incentive side remains
conspicuous.
The model’s third tier of originality, the sameness doctrine, attempts
to focus on the upstream incentive side of the balance by deterring
copiers who borrow from protected works with little to no originality of
their own. 19 It builds on copyright’s striking similarity rule and
presumes the existence of infringement, which the defendant is then
called upon to rebut. While this rule may have been intended to
compensate for the defendant focus of the other two rules, 20 in reality it
is likely to do no more than deter low-originality copying by a
defendant. To a creator, it has little independent effect on the ex ante
incentive to create a work of high creativity. In other words, while it

16
Id. at 1508 (“[O]ur framework will encourage creators to focus on the original content
of their works and thereby enhance their contributions to society.”).
17
Id. at 1533.
18
Id. at 1533–34.
19
Id. at 1542.
20
Id. at 1542–43 (“The rule’s secondary purpose is to strengthen the copyright protection
of original creators . . . .”).
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may serve to reduce less socially beneficial (that is, low-originality)
creations, it does little to actually induce the production of work likely to
generate greater social welfare (that is, high-originality).
The net incentive effects of the three tiers of the Parchomovsky-Stein
model are best illustrated in the table below.
Level
of
Originality
Exceptional
Relative
Low

Rule

Upstream
Incentive
of
None

Doctrine
Inequivalents
AddedValue Doctrine
Doctrine of
Sameness

Downstream
Incentive
Positive

Positive

Positive

None

Negative

As should be apparent, the model’s primary focus remains on
downstream creativity. This focus will affect copyright’s immunity
incentive, thereby promoting certain kinds of socially beneficial copying
(or borrowing) and deter others when socially suboptimal. Yet it does
little by way of affecting copyright’s ex ante incentive to create on the
traditional rights side, through copyright’s grant of exclusivity. By
failing to calibrate an independent creator’s entitlement to the extent of
the creative contribution in any meaningful way, the model opens itself
to objections of incompleteness and the likelihood of generating a
distortionary effect on copyright’s current (even if incomplete) balance
between upstream and downstream creativity.
It may well be that Parchomovsky and Stein believe that copyright’s
current overbreadth provides upstream, independent creators with
sufficient protection so as to not warrant any further modifications to
copyright’s upstream incentive. Alternatively, they may believe that
copyright’s other rules⎯such as the second fair use factor 21 ⎯do enough
already to disaggregate upstream works based on their creativity, or
indeed that all upstream creativity involves some amount of borrowing,
such that the downstream incentive suffices as an inducement in the
aggregate. If any of these options is indeed the case, the model would
benefit from elaborating on these assumptions.
21

See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2006) (requiring courts to look to “the nature of the copyrighted
work” as part of the fair use analysis).
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II. TRANSFORMATIVE USE AND THIN COPYRIGHT
Parchomovsky and Stein are no doubt correct that copyright’s
originality requirement, insofar as it is intended to operate as a filter, is
somewhat vacuous. Yet their model seems to pay insufficient attention
to the two areas where courts have, over the last two decades, come to
use creativity as a basis by which to modulate copyright’s entitlement
and liability structure. These are the doctrines of transformative use and
thin copyright protection. Might a refinement and combination of these
two doctrines achieve the same result as the authors’ proposals?
A.Transformative Use
Adopted by the Supreme Court in 1994, the transformative-use
variant of the fair use doctrine immunizes a defendant from liability for
infringement if the defendant’s work “adds something new, with a
further purpose or different character, altering the first [work] with new
expression, meaning, or message.” 22 In the years since its adoption, the
doctrine has come to be applied with great frequency by courts at
different levels. And in almost all instances, the principal focus of the
inquiry remains the defendant’s creative contribution to his or her use of
the work. 23
Thus, in situations where the defendant uses the work by modifying it
significantly, alters its presentation and content, develops it for an
altogether different market, or parodies it, courts have been ready to
exempt the defendant from a finding of infringement altogether. Indeed,
recent interpretations of the doctrine even seem to go so far as to
conclude that a defendant need not actually alter the underlying
expression in a work to make a transformative use of it. 24
To be sure, there exists a good deal of vagueness underlying the very
idea of “transformative”—a vagueness that courts have from time to
time struggled to make sense of in individual cases. Yet few seem to

22

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2007);
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251–53 (2d Cir. 2006); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d
811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1269–71
(11th Cir. 2001); Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 22–23 (1st Cir. 2000).
24
See, e.g., A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 638–40 (4th Cir.
2009).
23
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believe that the doctrine ought to be abolished altogether. Indeed, many
consider the doctrine to be copyright’s most important safety valve for
downstream creativity. 25
Parchomovsky and Stein acknowledge that courts currently use the
idea of “transformativeness” to examine the originality and creativity of
a work. 26 Yet, in their actual model, they say little about how their new
doctrines will interface with the functioning of transformative use. Since
they do not seem to advocate its retrenchment, they would leave courts
to undertake a similar analysis as part of two different doctrines, which
would surely be inefficient and redundant. Additionally, some of what
their model proposes is currently, or has been proposed to be, part of the
transformative use analysis. 27
Recasting transformative use as a doctrine of comparative
creativity⎯involving a comparison of a plaintiff’s and a defendant’s
works through the lens of their respective creative contributions⎯may
achieve several of the goals underlying the Parchomovsky-Stein model.
In situations where a defendant borrows from a plaintiff’s work, but in
the process adds significantly to it in terms of creativity, the current
version of transformative use exempts the defendant altogether from
liability for infringement. If this binary transformative/nontransformative classification were modified, and replaced in large part
by a system of mandatory compensation for transformative uses under
which a defendant were made to pay the original author for the creative
content borrowed (rather than exempted altogether), it would begin to
resemble the model’s “added-value doctrine.” Indeed, one might further
tweak the transformative use regime by requiring that courts refrain
from granting injunctive relief whenever a “reasonable contention” of
transformative use is made, as others—most recently Neil Netanel—
have advocated. 28 Under this regime, an injunction would be an option
25

See Pierre N. Leval, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter’s Rescue of Fair Use, 13
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 19 (1994) (arguing that in Campbell the Court effectively rescued
the fair use doctrine).
26
Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 1, at 1523.
27
See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality,
112 Yale L.J. 1, 55–58 (2002) (advocating a “profit allocation” remedy for uses that build on
prior works).
28
See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox 190–93 (2008). The “reasonable
contention” idea derives from the Court’s description of the transformative use doctrine in
Campbell. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10. Campbell in turn relied on Judge Leval’s article
for the point. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105,
1132, 1134 (1990).
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only when the defendant’s claim of transformative use is plainly
unreasonable, that is, in situations where the defendant’s own creative
contribution to the final work is negligible.
This leaves us with the model’s attempt to “immunize” exceptional
creativity from all suits for infringement through the doctrine of
inequivalents. 29 Parchomovsky and Stein are not very clear on how this
immunity would operate, especially in contrast to the fair use doctrine.
As noted earlier, liability for copyright infringement and the very
subsistence of copyright in a given work are only ever determined
bilaterally, in the context of a suit. If by “immunity” they mean a finding
of no infringement, this begins to resemble precisely what fair use
purports to do, even though courts often describe it as a “defense” to
infringement. The Copyright Act explicitly notes that a fair use is not an
instance of infringement at all, 30 thus distinguishing it from other
exceptions such as the “de minimis” rule. If the transformative use
doctrine’s original binary formula were retained for a narrow set of
creative works⎯such as those that “ha[ve] an obvious claim to
transformative value,” to use the Supreme Court’s language 31 ⎯and
upon such a finding, courts were to exempt the work from infringement
altogether, the result would be a rule analogous to the doctrine of
inequivalents.
B. Thin and Thick Copyright Protection
A modified transformative use regime such as the one described
above, however, still does not solve the problem identified earlier,
namely, the Parchomovsky-Stein model’s failure to disaggregate
copyright’s upstream and downstream incentives. If, as they describe,
social welfare is indeed maximized by works of greater creativity (rather
than mere numerosity), the system ought to provide a greater
inducement for such works. An option might lie in expanding
copyright’s rule of “thin” protection.
The doctrine of thin protection requires that for works with an
extremely low level of originality—such as those that borrow
extensively from the public domain—protection remain “thin,” and that
29

Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 1, at 1525.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement
of copyright.”) (emphasis added).
31
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (noting how a parody fits this category).
30
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an action for infringement be permitted only if a plaintiff can establish
“virtually identical copying.” 32 This is, of course, different from the
doctrine of striking similarity that the authors build upon in their
sameness rule. In the two decades since its origins, the doctrine has
grown a fair bit, with courts today extending it to works other than mere
compilations or collections. 33 Could this perhaps be used to disaggregate
copyright’s upstream incentive further, to maximize social welfare
originating in creativity?
One could imagine a sliding scale of creativity—along the lines that
Parchomovsky and Stein propose—coupled with a rule that alters what
is considered “copying” based on where on the spectrum a particular
work’s creative contribution lies. Works of exceptional creativity would
have a broader entitlement, perhaps extending to the “total concept and
feel” test for substantial similarity, 34 while those of average creativity
would have a shorter leash, and those of very low originality would be
relegated to having to show “virtually identical copying” for
infringement to lie.
While this approach resembles the sameness rule, it also differs from
it significantly. For one, it does more than just deter low-originality
copying by introducing an evidentiary presumption of prima facie
infringement. It signals to upstream creators that the extent of creativity
reflected in their work will influence the scope of their rights bundle, in
much the same way as the modified transformative use doctrine would
signal a potential variation in their immunity from liability to
downstream creators. The net result would be that creators know ex ante
that differing levels of creativity (measured perhaps by the extensiveness
and nature of their borrowing) will influence the scope of their rights
bundle, ideally encouraging the production of more works of highoriginality, and fewer ones of medium- to low-originality.

32

See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (establishing
the idea of “thin” copyright); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442
(9th Cir. 1994) (describing the idea of “virtually identical copying”); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy
Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying the rule).
33
See, e.g., Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (extending doctrine to
sculptures).
34
See 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright §13.03[A][1][c]
(2009) (describing and critiquing expansiveness of the test).

2009]

Tiered Originality

77

CONCLUSION
In attempting to show that the ideas central to the ParchomovskyStein proposal can perhaps be accommodated under current copyright
doctrine, my claim certainly is not that current copyright law already
does what the authors claim their model will. I merely suggest that there
might be good reason to introduce these ideas from within the system if
possible, rather than from outside. In previous work, I have argued that
copyright ought to be conceptualized as a common law entitlement and
that courts should take their job as copyright rulemakers seriously. 35 The
two devices that I identify as possible avenues here, via which the idea
of tiered originality can be effectuated, represent perhaps two of
copyright’s most notable judicial innovations in recent times. They lend
themselves well to the classical common law method of incrementalism
and to the pragmatic rule development that copyright law ought to adopt.
Integrating these ideas into the system, rather than overwhelming it with
a new set of concepts and devices, might thus serve to further this
process and perhaps reintroduce some semblance of coherence to a
normatively fragmented institution.
The idea of downstream incentives is certainly one to which copyright
law and theory ought to pay closer attention, and Parchomovsky and
Stein are right to focus their attention on the general neglect of this
phenomenon. Whether it merits a wholesale overhaul of the entire
system—including an unclear role for the fair use doctrine—I remain
unsure.

35

See Balganesh, supra note 7, at 1162.

